ABSTRACT To meet the urgent security demands, 5G aims to deploy virtualized and programmable security services and defense potential threats in real time. With the development of network function virtualization and software-defined networking, security functions can be dynamically and flexibly chained to cope with many types of malicious attacks. Although there are a number of studies on security function chaining for the 5G, they primarily focus on the security function composition, rather than rule enforcement. In fact, the misconfiguration of rules for security functions is notably common because of the security function diversity and rule heterogeneity that causes many unexpected and serious problems. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a priority-based anomaly-free mechanism with defined security rule anomalies. To avoid misconfiguration, we also propose and implement a simply configured rule management framework with anomaly resolution. With extensive performance evaluations, we show the availability and efficiency of our proposed mechanism to resolve security rule anomalies.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the mobile Internet, it is predicted that more than 5.5 billion devices will access the global mobile network five years later [1] . However, the mobile threat landscape is also becoming incresingly more serious. The famous network provider AT&T states that there are 11 billion security incidents each day [2] . In fact, in the current Internet, devices are always deployed with dedicated and coupled hardware and software [3] , [4] . As a result, it is notably difficult to upgrade these devices for newly emerged threats once they are deployed by the operators. Due to the emerging technologies of Software-Defined Networks (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV), it becomes possible to flexibly compose security functions on demand to cope with this challenges. These technologies are also adopted by the fifth-generation mobile communication (5G) to protect its mobile networks [5] .
Since 5G is able to offer flexible and dynamic security services by decoupling required security functions from their corresponding physical resources, security function chaining has attracted considerable attention from academia [6] - [9] . However, any security function cannot work effectively without correct security rules, and this has not been widely discussed in the 5G context. In fact, the misconfigurations of security rules are highly common in traditional security scenarios. According to [10] , even a specialist can make many mistakes when configuring firewall rules. Since there is a lack of simply configured rule management frameworks, it is difficult for people to manually address such a large number of rules with complex conditions. Moreover, a security function chain is usually composed of several types of security functions, and each function has unique configuration syntax. These properties all substantially increase the complexity of correct configuration. Additionally, the rules of different security functions in the same chain may also have conflicts. Therefore, it is necessary to check and resolve possible rule anomalies before enforcing them. These reasons motivate us to research the rule configuration issue.
Thus, in this paper, we concentrate on the relationships among different security function rules, and we define a rule anomaly classification for security function chaining. To check and resolve these possible anomalies, we propose a priority-based rule anomaly-free mechanism. Different with traditional method, it can handle these anomalies with less time by priority-based operation. Moreover, we also propose a simply configured rule management framework with anomaly resolution based on our previous works [11] . To evaluate the mechanism's performance, we implement the anomaly resolver module in our testbed. With the experiments compared with a classical anomaly-free mechanism, we verify the availability of our proposed framework and anomaly-free mechanism along with the efficiency of rule anomaly resolution.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We formalize the possible relationships among different security rules and define rule anomalies for security function chaining.
• We propose a priority-based anomaly-free mechanism to resolve anomalies by adjusting the priority of existing rules instead of rewriting them, which can improve the checking and resolving efficiency.
• We propose a simply configured rule management framework with anomaly resolution based on our previous works, and we implement the anomaly resolver in our testbed. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review related works about security rule anomalies. In section 3, we formalize security rules and their relationships and propose an anomaly classification for security function chaining. With the defined classification, a prioritybased anomaly-free mechanism is proposed to resolve corresponding anomalies. In section 4, we propose a simply configured rule management framework that implements configurations of security rules with anomaly resolution. In section 5, we implement the proposed mechanism in our prototype framework and make a performance evaluation of presented anomaly-free mechanism using two criteria: processing time and memory usage. For the comparative analysis, we also evaluate a classical firewall rule anomaly-free mechanism in the same environment. With many experiments for different kinds of anomalies, our proposed mechanism is verified to resolve the security rule anomaly with higher efficiency.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we review rule anomaly checking and resolving. E. Al-Shaer et al. is the earliest work that proposed the rule anomaly model for firewall rules with a corresponding checking method. In 2003, they studied the relationships of firewall rules [12] , and defined the rule anomaly in a single firewall and among different firewalls. These researchers depicted a policy tree for all firewall rules and proposed a checking method based on the state transit diagram. Based on their studies, Yuan et al. [13] modeled firewall rules as a binary decision diagram (BDD) and presented a corresponding anomaly checking method. Abedin et al. [14] focused on anomaly resolution and proposed a classical anomaly resolution mechanism, the core idea of which is concurrently maintaining an input rule list and an output rule list. The former is used to store the original rules for analysis and anomaly checking. Once an anomaly is found, the corresponding rule in the latter list will be deleted, modified or inserted for anomaly resolution. Thus, Ferraresi et al. [15] presented two algorithms to delete and resolve anomalies by adjusting the order of the rule list. These researchers also analyzed the existence and convergence of their solution. Hu et al. [16] proposed splitting firewall rules into a set of meta-rules and achieved fine-grain rule management by composing these meta-rules. Moreover, similar studies are also observed on other security functions. For instance, Hamed et al. [17] observed that the IPsec-based VPN has the same problems. Moreover, Yang [18] considered the contradiction between VPNs and firewalls (or Network Address Translators) and proposed a corresponding checking mechanism.
With the development of the SDN, Al-Shaer and Al-Haj [19] proposed a BDD-based OpenFlow flowtable checking method according to their previous works, which is adaptable for a single OpenFlow switch. Next, Ferguson et al. [20] focused on the OpenFlow switch anomaly problems and proposed using a hierarchical flow-table (HFT) and making decisions on each single packet with a tree structure. After a year, these researchers designed an SDN controller authorized API for a network administrator in a single network domain based on their existing work [21] . These researchers presented a hierarchical share tree to classify the management level in order to solve two main problems: 1) decoupling the control plane and the global view of the network, and 2) resolving the contradictions among different users. Wang et al. [22] followed their work and presented an interval trees model for quick anomaly checking and managing privileges using the previous share tree. Additionally, they proposed a recovery mechanism for mistaken deletions. Furthermore, Maldonado-Lopez et al. [23] modeled the SDN filter rule using the Alloy language based on the work of Al-Shaer et al. Pisharody et al. [24] proposed a kind of security function using the applications of SDN controllers. By referring to the existing firewall rule anomaly problems, these researchers focused on the relationship between different rules in the flow-table. In addtion, Valenza et al. [25] proposed validating security policies using remote attestation.
However, there is no existing mechanism for diverse security rule anomaly resolution in a security function chain. Therefore, based on the work of E. Al-Shaer et al., we propose a new mechanism to solve the problem. Inspired by design of CoVisor [26] and Brew [27] , we implement a priority-based mechanism to avoid time-wasting operations. Nevertheless, our proposed mechanism is used for generic security rule anomaly solving, rather than SDN flow table composition.
III. RULE ANOMALY FORMALIZATION AND RESOLUTION
In this section, we present a formalized description of general security rule relationships and define possible anomaly classification with a corresponding resolution.
A. SECURITY RULE FORMAT
In this subsection, a general security rule format is introduced. Because the security function chain is composed of several different security functions, there are a variety of security rules to be enforced. With the diversity of rules, its generic format is proposed to describe security rules.
Assuming there is a specific security function chain, rule R i represents the rule for the ith security function of the chain. It consists of security function type R i .type, rule ID R i .id, matching field R i .match, security action R i .action and priority R i .priority. An example of a rules list is denoted as follows:
R i .type represents the type of the security function where the security rule enforces, such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Deep Packet Inspections (DPIs).
R i .match represents the matching field of security rules, which is composed of many filtering conditions on different layers. For example, the matching field of the firewall rule is often a five tuple, including the source IP address, destination IP address, protocol type, source port and destination port.
R i .action represents the security action. It includes all kinds of possible security functions, such as the 'accept' and 'drop' for firewall rules and the 'accept' and 'alert' for IDS rules.
B. FORMALIZATION OF RULE RELATIONS
In this subsection, all possible relationships between two different security rules are defined. These security rules may be from the same or different security functions. Based on the firewall rule definition, we define the relationships based on the matching field of these security rules to discover the possible anomalies.
Definition 1: Rules R i and R j are matching if the matching field of R i is a subset of or equal to R j . Formally,
For example, rule 0 and rule 20 in Table 1 are matching. Definition 2: Rules R i and R j are correlated if part of the matching field of rule R i is a subset of or equal to the corresponding part of R j whereas the other part is a superset of the corresponding part of R j . Formally,
where R i .match ∈ M i and R j .match ∈ M j . For example, rule 3 and rule 20 in Table 1 are correlated. Definition 3: Rules R i and R j is imbricated if part of the matching field of rule R i is a subset of or equal to the corresponding part of R j , whereas the other part is a superset of the corresponding part of R j . Formally,
where
For example, rule 4 and rule 20 in Table 1 are imbricated. Definition 4: Rules R i and R j are disjointed if part of the matching field of rule R i is not a subset of, a superset of or equal to the corresponding part of R j . Formally,
For example, rule 2 and rule 20 in Table 1 are disjointed.
C. ANOMALY CLASSIFICATION
In this subsection, according to the firewall rule anomaly classification, the generic security rule anomaly classification is defined as follows:
1) REDUNDANCY
A redundancy anomaly occurs if the matching field of rule R i is a subset of Rule R j and both of them have same actions. Thus, rules R i and R j are redundant. Formally,
For example, rule 0 and rule 20 in Table 1 are redundant, because they have the same matching fields and actions.
2) SHADOWING
A shadowing anomaly occurs if the matching field of rule R i is a subset of rule R j , whereas the actions of them are different. Thus, rule R i and R j are shadowing. Formally,
For example, rule 1 and rule 20 in Table 1 are shadowing, because they have same matching fields but different actions. 
3) CORRELATION
A correlation anomaly occurs if part of the matching field of rule R i overlaps with the corresponding part of rule R j , whereas the actions of rules R i and R j are different. Formally,
For example, rule 3 and rule 20 in Table 1 are correlad because the matching fields of rule 3 and rule 20 are overlapped and they both belong to the IP layer but have different actions.
4) IMBRICATION
An imbrication anomaly occurs if the matching field of rule R i is applied on different layers than that of rule R j , and the actions of rules R i and R j are different. Formally,
For example, rule 4 and rule 20 in Table 1 are imbricated because the matching fields of rule 4 and rule 20 are overlapped but they belong to different layers and have different actions.
To clearly explain the above anomaly classification, the Venn Diagram of all possible rule anomalies is shown as Fig. 1 .
D. ANOMALY RESOLVING
In this subsection, based on the priority of security rules, an anomaly-free solution is proposed for the stated anomalies. Assuming that there is an existing security rule R 1 in the security policy database, the new rule R 2 should be checked and processed as follows.
1) REDUNDANCY
To resolve the redundancy anomaly, keep the existing security rule and do not change it. Assuming that the remaining rule is R remain ,
To resolve the shadowing anomaly, more information is needed because there may be contradictory security rules for different services. Thus, instead of default setting, we choose to query the control plane by sending messages to the local classifier.
3) CORRELATION
To resolve the correlation anomaly, first the intersection of two rules should be processed. Assuming that the new rule is R intersect ,
Then, to split the rules R 1 and R 2 in terms of their intersection and obtain the new rules R a and R b ,
4) IMBRICATION
To resolve imbrication anomaly, the intersection of two rules should be processed. Assuming that the new rule is R union , R union .priority = R 1 .priority + R 2 .priority (32)
IV. RULE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
In this section, a simple-configured rule management framework is proposed to enforce security policies for security function chaining based on our previous works [11] . Specially, the design of the Anomaly Resolver is described in detail to identify and resolve all possible security rule anomalies in a specific chain. As shown in Fig. 2 , the proposed framework is comprised of three layers, including the policy plane, the control plane and the data plane.
A. POLICY PLANE
The policy plane is designed for network security administrators to configure required security policies. To simplify the complex configurations of diverse security functions with various equipment types, there is an integrated user interface to choose the required security service for one Web page. In the policy plane, the policy is formalized as a tuple. The policy only includes the required function type, rule name, matching field, and action, which is independent of the specific security device. Moreover, the function type is optional to the network administrator if he/she is uncertain about the required type.
Once the security policy is submitted, there is a Policy Listener that receives the user configuration. The Policy Listener formalizes the user-faced policy as the formatting policy, which can be read by the rule translator in the control plane.
B. CONTROL PLANE
In the control plane, there is a Rule Translator that receives the formatting policy from the Policy Listener and translates it into the uniform rule. With the translation, the received rule is saved as a type of machine-read data structure, including the type of security function, the rule name, the rule ID, the matching field, the action and the rule priority. If the function type is empty, the translator can choose a suitable pre-defined type with the matching field and the action. Furthermore, the matching field consists of several matching elements that are separated by semicolons. To check rule anomalies, all the elements are rearranged in order. The policy ID is generated based on the system time and assigned to each new rule by the translator. The rule priority is randomly generated for anomaly resolution.
Once the received rule is formalized, it is written into in the database in real time. Since the security function chain may cross multiple domains, its security rules are stored in different domains, because it is difficult to store all security rules in a centralized way. Thus, the database in the control plane is distributed to ensure rule consistency.
After the translation and storage, the Rule Translator notifies the Anomaly Resolver to run its anomaly check with the new rule ID. The flowchart of the Anomaly Resolver is shown as Fig. 3 . When the anomaly resolver receives the notification from the rule translator, it begins to access the database and check for possible existing anomalies between the new rule and the existing rules. If there is no anomaly, the new rule is directly read from the database for the next step. If an anomaly existis, it will resolve the anomaly according to the proposed method of part D of section III. Redundancy, correlation and imbrication anomalies are easy to resolve based on the priority and update the database before reading the new rule. However, for the shadowing anomaly, it has to stop reading the new rule and report the anomaly result to the network administrator.
Once the anomaly checking and resolving is finished, the modified new rule is sent to the YANG Formatter. To actualize automatic configuration, the rule is enforced by standardized NETCONF protocol [28] with its specific data modeling language YANG [29] . With the formatter, the rule is formalized with the YANG model.
The Config Generator is called by the YANG Formatter to generate an XML format configuration file. In this file, the rule ID, the matching field, the action and the priority are included. Since the rule configuration is based on our previous works [11] , it is unnecessary to describe the file in details.
With the function type, the Config Manager requests the location information of the required security function from an external SFC Controller, which is in charge of the placement of security function chains. Since the design of the SFC Controller is beyond the scope of this paper, there is no need to explain it. After the assigned security function is certain, the Config Manager can send the generated file to the data plane using the NETCONF protocol.
C. DATA PLANE
On the data plane, there is a corresponding Config Agent that receives the configuration file with the NETCONF protocol on each security function node. Therefore, the presented YANG model is also used in the data plane. Because the data processing is similar to the control plane, it is unnecessary to detail its. To reserve all of the security rules, there is a local database to store received security configurations.
After the Config Agent finishes the storage to the local database, it will write the configuration to the specific security function. Finally, with the inserted security rule, the new policy is enforced.
D. WORKFLOW OF SECURITY RULE MANAGEMENT
We present an example of security function chaining in 5G by illustrating the workflow of the proposed framework, which is shown as Fig. 4 . In this case, after traffic passes through the virtualized radio access functions, there is a chain that consists of a firewall and an IDS to meet the user's security requirement. Thus, the network security administrator can block malicious flows using this security function chain.
First, the network security administrator should configure the policy to block known malicious flows with the firewall. Then, he/she logs in on the policy configuration page with the authorization. With the characteristic of suspicious flow, the administrator fills in the matching field (such as the five-tuple of the TCP/IP) and chooses the action as 'drop'. A well-recognized name is also necessary for this policy. Since the function type is optional, he/she can choose the type as 'firewall' or leave it blank.
Once the administrator presses the 'submit' button, the filled policy information is transmitted to the control plane by the Policy Listener Next, the Rule Translator formats the received policy as a uniform rule based on the defined data structure. There are generated IDs and priorities calculated by the system time. To keep rule consistency, all of the rules are stored in the Distributed Database in the control plane, which can be shared if the security function chain through pass multiple domains.
When the data storage operation is finished, the Anomaly Resolver is triggered to access the database and check whether there is a rule anomaly as previouly discussed. With the proposed anomaly-free mechanism, all the rule anomalies can be assessed and processed in this period.
After updating the database, the YANG Formatter is activated to describe the new rule with the YANG model language for NETCONF-based configuration transmission.
Later, the Config Generator saves the configuration as an XML format file.
To send the configuration to the corresponding security function, the Config Manager is used to request its location information from the SFC Controller. There is a connection between the control plane and the data plane with the NETCONF protocol.
For the security function node on the data plane, there is a Config Agent charging of the configuration reception. The configuration will also be stored in the local database as a backup. To date, the enforcement of the firewall policy is achieved by writing this configuration into the firewall rule list.
Next, the network administrator also needs to block more suspicious flows with the IDS. After that step, he/she will configure the IDS policy on the same page. After the similar process, all required security function policies are enforced with this security function chain.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, in order to evaluate the performance of the proposed anomaly-free mechanism, we implement it in Python. Since the implementation of the main framework is introduced in our previous works [11] , we easily add the Anomaly Resolver module into our testbed. Next, we evaluate the performance of the anomaly-free mechanism with many experiments using this testbed.
A. EVALUATION ENVIRONMENT
We test the proposed anomaly-free solution using previously stated different types of security rule anomalies. To evaluate its performance, we also implement the classical anomalyfree mechanism proposed by [14] with Python codes. For distinction, our proposed method is called the prioritybased mechanism, whereas the classical method is called the two-list mechanism.
The evaluation is tested by a variety of rule sets with different sizes. Based on the often-used datasets from existing papers, we choose the sizes of the rule sets as follows: 50, 100, 300, 500, 800, 1200, 1500 and 2000. Furthermore, to evaluate the performance, we create different rule sets for four anomaly types. There are also corresponding comparative rule sets without anomalies.
Moreover, according to the commonly used firewall rules survey, we create a realistic security rule set with mixed anomalies. Because there is no imbrication anomaly for firewall rules, we assume that the number of deployed firewall rules is same as the number of IDS rules. Therefore, there are nearly 50% imbrication anomalies and the rest of it has a similar anomaly distribution with the survey, as shown in Table 2 .
During the experiments, we take the processing time and memory usage as evaluation parameters. The processing time shows how much time the anomaly-free mechanism costs, and the memory usage shows how much system memory it occupies. To eliminate test errors, we repeat each experiment 20 times and calculate their means. Fig. 5 shows the processing times for the redundant rule sets with different sizes. As a result, both the priority-based mechanism and the two-list mechanism cost more processing time when the size of rule sets is increasing. The processing time of the priority-based mechanism is always shorter than that of the two-list mechanism. Furthermore, the processing time of the priority-based mechanism is always less than 10 ms, even for the maximum sized rule set with 2000 rules. To compare, the processing time of the two-list mechanism is considerable longer. When the size of rule set is less than 500, the time is less than 100 ms, which is acceptable. However, when the size of the rule set is 2000, the processing time reaches 400 ms. The reason is that two-list mechanism has to maintain an input rule list and an output rule list. When the anomaly is discovered in the input list, the output list is also modified. Moreover, the priority-based mechanism does not maintain an output rule list during the anomaly checking and resolving process. In other word, the priority-based mechanism saves processing time by simplifying its rule list. Fig. 6 shows the processing time for shadowing rule sets with different sizes. As a result, both the priority-based mechanism and the two-list mechanism cost more processing time when the size of rule sets is increasing. The processing time of the priority-based mechanism is always shorter than that of the two-list mechanism. Moreover, the difference between two kinds of rule sets becomes increasingly bigger when the size of the rule set increases. When the size of rule set reaches 2000, the processing time of the priority-based mechanism is 630 ms, and that of the two-list mechanism is 1050 ms. To keep the processing time less than 100 ms, the priority-based mechanism should limit the sizes of rule sets to be less than 300, whereas the two-list mechanism should limit the sizes to be less than 200. Obviously, the efficiency of priority-based mechanism is better since it cannot immediately process the shadowing rule and sends a request to the control plane for more details to make a decision. However, the two-list mechanism writes a default rule, which costs more time. Fig. 7 shows the processing time for correlated rule sets with different sizes. As a result, both the priority-based mechanism and the two-list mechanism cost more processing time when the size of the rule sets is increasing. Additionally, the processing time is usually no less than one second, which is obviously longer than other cases. According to the correlation resolving process using the priority-base mechanism, the received rule and existing rule should split the intersection of them and insert the remaining parts into the databases, which leads to long processing time. However, the two-list mechanism chooses to update the corresponding rules in the output list instead of rewriting new rules in the database. In fact, updating existing rules may cost more time than inserting a new rule. Even when the size of rule set is 2000, the processing time of the priority-base mechanism is nearly 10 ms, which is considerable less than that of the two-list mechanism. In addition, the long processing time has little influence on resolving anomalies in the real scenario because the proportion of the correlation is notably small in realistic rule sets. Fig. 8 shows the processing time for imbrication rule sets with different sizes. Because the imbrication does not exist in the firewall, there is no comparative analysis for the twolist mechanism. As a result, the priority-based mechanism costs more processing time when the size of the rule sets is increasing. Before the size of the rule sets reaches 500, the processing time is less than 100 ms. When the size is 2000, the processing time is less than 440 ms, which is also acceptable. Fig. 9 shows the processing time for anomaly-less rule sets with different sizes. As a result, both the priority-based mechanism and the two-list mechanism cost more processing time when the size of the rule sets is increasing. The differences between the processing times of two mechanisms are small. Except for special cases, the processing time of the priority-based mechanism is longer than that of the two-list mechanism. Moreover, the processing time for anomaly-less is longer than that for redundancy, shadowing and imbrication. The main reason is that checking rule anomalies costs much more time than resolving anomalies, and the prioritybased mechanism must check more kinds of anomalies during the process. However, the processing time for correlation is different because the operation is too complex for resolving anomalies.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 1) PROCESSING TIMES FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF ANOMALIES

2) PROCESSING TIME FOR MIXED ANOMALIES
In this subsection, the proposed priority-based mechanism is compared with the two-list mechanism for a realistic rule set with different sizes, shown as Fig. 10 . As a result, both the priority-based mechanism and the two-list mechanism cost more processing time when the size of rule sets is increasing. The processing time of the priority-based mechanism is always shorter than that of the two-list mechanism. Even when the size of the rule set reaches 2000, the processing time of the priority-based mechanism is less than 600 ms, but the two-list mechanism is more than one second. Moreover, the difference between two types of rule sets becomes increasingly larger when the sizes of the rule sets increase.
According to the comparative analysis in the above subsection, the processing time for the realistic case is usually shorter than that of a single anomaly rule set. The reason is that the correlation that costs the biggest processing time has notably small proportion in the realistic rule set. The largest proportion is imbrication, which only costs a little time to process. Therefore, in realistic cases, the processing time is acceptable.
3) MEMORY USAGE FOR DIFFERENT ANOMAIES
In this paper, we also test the memory usage for different types of anomalies, including the previously mentioned single anomaly type rule sets and the mixed type rule sets with several different sizes, as shown in Fig. 11 . The sign ''o'' denotes the memory costs of the priority-based mechanism, whereas the sign ''*'' denotes the two-list mechanism. As a result, there are no obvious differences among different sizes of rule sets and different anomaly types. It means that the anomaly type and the sizes of rule sets have little influence on memory usage. In Fig. 11 , the minimum memory usage is 18 MB and the maximum usage is 23 MB. It is obvious that the memory usage of both the priority-based mechanism and the two-list mechanism are acceptable.
In general, the proposed priority-based mechanism is suitable for security rule anomaly resolution.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
With the development of SDN/NFV technologies, 5G proposes flexibly deploying security functions to defend against diverse threats by chaining them in sequences. However, except for existing works on security function compositions, it is important to check and avoid possible security rule anomalies. Therefore, we propose the formation of possible security rule anomalies and a priority-based anomalyfree mechanism to resolve them. We also propose a simply configured rule management framework for security function chaining. To evaluate the performance of the anomaly-free mechanism, we conduct many experiments with different size of rule sets and different anomaly types. Moreover, a classical firewall rule anomaly mechanism is also implemented for comparative analysis. The result shows that our proposed mechanism is useful for resolving security rule anomalies in security function chains and can efficiently obtain improved anomaly resolution.
